From Rags to Riches: by Razavi, Shahra
I Introduction
This article takes up the theme of 'gender and
poverty', but looks at it from the vantage point of
women living in an increasingly opulent setting.
The case study comes from a small rural commu-
nity in south-eastern Iran. The selected region has
some distinct features which make it interesting for
exploring this particular conjunction of social
forces: relative opulence generated through agricul-
tural export earnings, on the one hand, and pow-
erful gender discriminatory relations sanctioned by
local custom and reinforced through state policy,
on the other. The article will explore the contradic-
tory implications that the rising levels of household
income have had for women. lt does so by using
two different, but related, ways of capturing how
women have fared in the context of these socio-
economic changes.
First, defining poverty/well-being as a 'state of
being or doing' (as in Sen's 'functionings'), we look
at gender differentials in well-being indicators. In
this context we focus on some of the most extreme
forms of deprivation - infant and child mortality -
to see if they reflect gender bias in parental care, as
one might expect from the geographical distribu-
tion of masculine sex ratios. Although it is difficult
to draw any firm conclusions about changes in dis-
criminatory practices on the basis of time-series
trends in mortality sex ratios, we offer some tenta-
tive explanations for the observed patterns.
We then explore issues of vulnerability which are
highlighted in women's own accounts of well-
being. Vulnerability here refers to the complex
bundles of risk that are hemming women in, mak-
ing them more dependent on male incomes: the
weakening of women's independent economic
sphere; the withdrawal of female labour from farm
work; and their forced reliance on a labour market
that is highly segmented and discriminatory In
many ways these changes seem to add up to a dete-
rioration in women's 'fall back position'. However,
in response we also find a series of coping strategies
through which women seek to make their lives
more secure - demanding a share of the family
legacy (land); demanding remuneration for their
labour obligations within marriage; and a tendency
to invest their wages in assets that are less vulnera-
ble to male predation.
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Although it is difficult to generalise from the expe-
rience documented in this case study, some of our
findings may have wider relevance. Strategies for
increasing rural incomes may entail a number of
unforeseen negative consequences for women. The
specific ways in which these macro-policies affect
women depend on a variety of factors, amongst
them the growth trajectory, the various institutions
which mediate the benefits of growth (markets, the
state), and the pre-existing gender relations. In the
case study documented in this paper, for example,
'underemployment' rather than 'overemployment'
seems to be the critical gender issue that is
emerging.'
The article also draws attention to the relative
strengths and weaknesses of 'objective' measures of
well-being. While well-being indicators (measured
directly on the individual) are more conducive to
obtaining a gender-differentiated picture of depriva-
tion than are household-based measures (as in the
poverty line approach), they are nevertheless lim-
ited in the extent to which they can capture differ-
ent aspects of gender discrimination. Some of these
limitations are highlighted in this paper by drawing
on women's own accounts of well-being which
focus on issues of vulnerability and security within
marriage. As we see below, the way in which the
concept of vulnerability is used here differs in sev-
eral respects from its usage in the mainstream liter-
ature and highlights some of the ways in which the
concept has to be reformulated if gender is to be
brought in as a core concern.
2 Opulence and Well-Being: The
National Context
The study region is set within a country which, by
standard opulence criteria, is considered to be 'mid-
dle-income'. Some of this wealth at least seems to
be contributing to the achievement of basic needs.
With an average life expectancy of almost 68 years,
an infant mortality rate of 25 per 1,000, and an
adult literacy rate of 65 per cent, Iran ranks
amongst the 'medium human development'
In the context of export promotion in many African
rural economies, in contrast, an important gender issue
appears to be women's increasing work loads (e.g.
Uganda Women's Network 1995; Palmer 1991).
'The state commitment to improving basic needs was no
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achievers (UNDP 1995). A critical factor in this
process seems to have been Iranian state policy
which in the post-1979 period has identified the
improvement of basic needs as one of its main pri-
orities! Over a period of almost 15 years infant
mortality has dropped from 104 per 1,000 to 25 per
1,000; life expectancy has risen from 55 to 68 years.
Literacy rates over the same period have gone from
under half to around two-thirds, and are still rising;
the gap between urban and rural literacy is closing;
and rural infrastructure - safe drinking water, elec-
tricity and roads - has been significantly improved
(The Economist, 18 January 1997). Even though
the rationing system which was put in place during
the Iran-Iraq war has now virtually ceased to exist,
universal state subsidies on bread, fuel, medicine
and other basic necessities continue to shield the
population from the vagaries of market forces
unleashed by Iran's liberalisation and restructuring
programs (albeit without IMF loans).
Cross-cutting, and potentially off-setting some of
the benefits of these economic and social policies,
are a set of powerful gender relations which are
institutionalised within the household and the mar-
ket, and reinforced through state policies. Falling
within the so-called classic belt of 'patriarchy-
patriliny-patrilocality', the typical Iranian house-
hold is a corporate entity with women's economic
independence and personal autonomy highly cir-
cumscribed. Hand in hand with the more benign
social and economic policies noted above, state
presence of a more ambiguous kind has tended to
reinforce these gender-based restrictions. The
schools, the mosques, the mass media and various
revolutionary organs convey messages about 'pro-
priety' and 'decency', backed by powerful sanctions
(including force where necessary), which serve to
preserve and reinforce men's privileged position
within conjugal and gender relations. Symbolising
the entry of the urban Islamic culture into the rural
milieu - which has been historically more lax about
women's physical mobility and attire - is the black
veil (chador) that increasingly adorns school girls
and young women.
doubt an outcome of the revolutionary process that
brought the Islamic regime to power. As many have
argued, the Islamic Republic itself is a highly eclectic
entity which combines traditionalist elements of shi'i
Islam with aspects of Third World populism and state
socialism (Abrahamian 1993).
Looking more closely at the Rafsanjan district, the
first point to note is that as the main producer of
Iran's leading export crop (pistachio), it ranks
amongst the most affluent regions in the country
While commercial relations have had a long history
in this region, since the mid-1960s a number of fac-
tors (state policies, water shortages) have hastened
the transition from semi-subsistence agriculture
into full-scale cash cropping so that by the early
1980s most of the villages in the Rafsanjan basin
produced nothing but pistachio. At the same time
the persistence of a hierarchical class structure -
where the descendants of the absentee landlords
still own a significant proportion of the region's land
and water resources - has meant that the export
earnings are very unequally divided. Yet a number
of social changes - some of them sanctioned by the
state - have served to reduce class inequality
Irrigation technology - which prior to 1979 was the
preserve of the rural elite - has become more widely
accessible; this has led to the emergence of a small
strata of rich peasants (some of whom are politically
connected to the state), and a labour force that is
marginally landed ('garden owners'). More impor-
tantly though as far as the landless and the land-
poor are concerned, the landlord-peasant relations
have undergone a qualitative sea-change; a more
enlightened style of capitalism has replaced the
archaic 'feudal' relations of domination. A progres-
sive Labour Code backed by state sanction has
obliged the absentee owners of large-scale pistachio
farms to provide their attached male labourers with
a wage that is above the national minimum wage,
health insurance, paid holidays, and compensation
in case of unfair dismissal.3 The labour market nev-
ertheless remains rigidly segmented, and the labour
relations within the female segments bear no resem-
blance to the favourable conditions that prevail in
some male segments of the market (more on this
later).
The general point raised above about state presence
certainly applies to the study villages. On the one
hand, this has been reflected in the development of
rural infrastructure; most villages in the district now
have piped water and electricity, paved roads, pri-
mary schools and access to state-funded mobile
immunisation units. At the same time, the very
structures that have brought 'development' to these
remote villages - schools, roads, electricity (televi-
sion) - also serve as a conduit for state propaganda
and control. The dominant household model, and
the symbols and social norms that accompany it,
legitimise male advantage within the conjugal con-
tract, redefine the concepts of gendered space, and
tighten the female segments within the labour mar-
ket. Moreover, the failure to recognise women as
independent persons means that state efforts to dis-
tribute assets (land, water) more fairly and to pro-
tect the rights of agricultural workers completely
by-pass women.
3 The Strengths and Limitations
of Well-Being Indicators
There has been much debate on the gender biases
that imbue measurements of poverty As many have
argued, using human development indicators (as
opposed to opulence criteria such as income), is
preferable not only for drawing attention to the
actual realisation of basic needs (as opposed to the
potential value of income in achieving those needs),
but also because it is less prone to gender bias as it
is measured directly on the individual (Kabeer
1996). Moreover, 'objective' indicators of well-
being are not subject to the same cultural biases that
are likely to affect people's self-perceptions of well-
being - a bias that is particularly acute in the case
of women (Sen 1987). For all these reasons gender
differentials in infant and child death rates can cap-
ture an important dimension of relative female
deprivation. Do the Iranian mortality figures con-
form to the pattern emerging from other parts of the
patriarchal belt (Pakistan, North India, Bangladesh)
where significant social factors outweigh and
reverse the pattern that is expected on the basis of
biological sex differentials in life chances?
Unfortunately, the Iranian vital statistics obtained
through large-scale sample surveys are quite old
(Sd 1978). As one might expect, however, they
indicate a significant degree of female disadvantage
in early age survivorship, which is particularly acute
during infancy (rn/f ratio of 0.91) and early child-
hood (rn/f ratio of 0.8). To put the picture of
To escape the requirements of the Labour Code, the labourers who, as refugees, are not entitled to the same
capitalist owners increasingly resort to hiring Afghani rights as Iranian workers.
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relative female deprivation in perspective, it would
be useful to compare the Iranian figures with their
Indian equivalents. While the Indian mortality
ratios during the same period (1976-1978) were
feminine too - for both infants and young children
- the extent of female disadvantage was marginally
less pronounced in India than in Iran. This is quite
a significant point, given that the Indian ratios are
themselves highly 'perverse' by international stan-
dards. While recent national figures for infant mor-
tality in Iran indicate a significant improvement in
The field research was carried out between September
1988 and August 1989 as part of the authorl DPhil thesis
(Razavi 1992).
Table 1: Infant and Child Mortality Rates
for the Interval between 1 month and 5 years
in Rafsanjan, Iran (number of live births)
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* The mortality ratios for males and females are significantly different from
each other at 95 per cent confidence.
infant survivorship, we have little information on
the relative life chances of girls and boys. Our vil-
lage level data4 provides some clues on the possible
trends.
A somewhat similar picture of relative female depri-
vation emerges from our village-level data, which
was based on the fertility histories of all ever-mar-
ried women (see Table 1). The cumulative results
for infant and child mortality (based on deaths
between one month and 5 years) show female
The mortality rates were based on the fertility histories
of women aged 1 5-59 years; women in older age groups
(59 years plus) were excluded due to possible memory
lapses.
Women's Age Group Infant and Child Mortality Rates (a) M/F
15-34 Male 40 (267)
Female 37 (246)
Both 39 (518) 1.08
35-39 Male 100 (100)
Female 112 (98)
Both 106 (198) 0.89
40-44 Male 98 (92)
Female 153 (85)
Both 124 (177) 0.64
45-49 Male 110* (109)
Female 267* (120)
Both 192 (229) 0.41
50-54 Male 145 (117)
Female 224 (76)
Both 176 (193) 0.65
55-59 Male 243 (74)
Female 194 (67)
Both 220 (141) 1.25
15-59 Male 101* (690)
Female 137* (625)
Both 118 (1315) 0.74
(a) Per 1,000 live births
mortality to be 26 per cent higher than male mor-
tality (rn/f ratio of 0.74). The extent of female dis-
advantage reflected in the data set thus seems to be
even more pronounced than in the national survey
data noted above.
The South Asian literature on excess female mortal-
ity has identified both proximate determinants (sex
bias in food intake and in access to health care) and
underlying causes ('economic' and 'cultural under-
valuation of women) in order to explain these mor-
tality differentials.6 As far as the proximate
mechanisms are concerned, in the study region we
have found a number of health beliefs and customs
which are suggestive of gender bias in parental care.
Although it is difficult to establish direct causality
between these health beliefs and the observed sex
differentials in mortality, it would not be unreason-
able to assume that they have an impact on the
observed mortality patterns.7 However it should
also be noted that our village-level evidence does
not indicate any demographic manipulation of the
kind documented by Monica Das Gupta (1987) in
the case of Punjab, where specific categories of
daughters are consciously neglected.8 The excess
mortality of female infants and children in
Rafsanjan is thus likely to be the outcome of gener-
alised neglect rather than selective discrimination.9
In other words parents seem to have internalised
certain norms that lead them to give better care to
their sons than to their daughters, so that excess
female mortality is an unintended consequence.
How can we explain the under-valuation of females
which is ultimately responsible for truncating the
survival chances of young females? Many of the
There is a vast literature on this subject; some of it has
been summarised in Harriss (1987).
That sex bias does flot always work in a consistent
manner is shown by a study of eye disease where 'health
care' caused iatrogenic loss of vision amongst male
infants since they were more exposed than female infants
to harmful therapy such as steroid eye cream (Cohen,
cited in Harriss 1987). Similarly, gender bias in food
intake does not always translate into female disadvantage
as far as anthropometric and mortality outcomes are
concerned because females need absolutely less of most
nutrients than do males (Harriss 1990).
8 In the Punjab study girls born to mothers who already
had one or more surviving daughters experienced 53 per
cent higher chance of mortality than the average rate
which is recorded for their male and female siblings.
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factors that have been implicated in the Indian
debate - women's low rates of labour participation,
their tenuous inheritance rights, their low social sta-
tus and limited autonomy within marriage - can
also explain son preference in the Iranian context
(although dowry is not an issue in Iran). However,
while it seems reasonable to explain excess female
mortality in terms of patriarchal gender relations, it
is dangerous to rely on mortality differentials as an
indicator of womenís subordination. Below I elabo-
rate on this point.
Looking more closely at the data set one of the
points that clearly emerges is the falling proportion
of infant and child deaths with the age of the
mother - the proportion falls from nearly 22 per
cent for the 55-59 age group to 3.9 per cent for
women aged 15-34 years. While the reasons for
this trend are complex, we can at least speculate
that some of the reduction in mortality reflects an
improvement in infant and child survivorship over
time, which has also been noted for the country as
a whole.'° Given the significant investments that
have been made by the public sector in the provi-
sion of primary health care, electricity, safe drinking
water and basic education, such trends are to be
expected.
More controversially though, the data indicate a
gradual convergence of male and female life
chances over time so that the infant and child mor-
tality rates for mothers in the youngest age group
(15-34 years) are in fact masculine (rn/f ratio of
1.08). Although we need to be cautious in inter-
preting these rates - given the small number of
cases on which they are based - it is not
It would be interesting to see whether this point still
holds in the context of the dramatic reductions in fertility
rates that have been documented since the late 1980s
(government sources claim that there has been a 50 per
cent reduction in the population growth rate - from 3.9
per cent down to nearly 2 per cent).
The major problem in interpreting these rates stems
from the difficulty of differentiating between 'historical
time' and 'personal time'. In other words, some of the
reduction in mortality could reflect an improvement in
infant and child survivorship over time (as we assume).
But a woman's life cycle position, quite independently of
'historical' factors, is also likely to affect the welfare of her
children. Unfortunately our data set does not allow us to
differentiate between these two factors.
unreasonable to assume that a convergence (or even
reversal) of male and female mortality rates for
infants and children may be happening under con-
ditions of general mortality decline. If this is indeed
the case, over the next decade or so the phenome-
non of excess female mortality during infancy and
childhood maybe disappearing from the Iranian life
tables due to the general improvements in infant
and child survivorship, It is quite likely that the dis-
criminatory forces (such as differential health care)
which led to excess female mortality in the past are
still in place, but because of the general improve-
ments in the nutrition and health status of infants
and children they no longer translate into mortality
differentials. In other words, if we assume that
excess female mortality was due to discriminatory
behaviour, it would not necessarily follow that the
disappearance of the excess has been due to a mod-
ification of that behaviour; it might have been
mainly a function of the mortality decline itself. But
it is worth bearing in mind that the convergence of
male and female life chances during infancy and
early childhood is not an inevitable (or automatic)
outcome of mortality decline.
Looking at the broader picture, it becomes clear
that although over time, with mortality decline, the
female disadvantage in life expectation is likely to
disappear, sex differences in early age mortality
have tended to persist in some regions more than
others. Punjab is a particularly instructive case since
it shows that a pronounced sex differential in early
age mortality can remain even in an economic envi-
ronment conducive to improved survivorship.
Improvements in living standards and health care in
the Ludhiana District (Punjab), for example, have
led to significant rises in early age survivorship and
overall life expectancy; the infant mortality rate fell
from 129 per 1,000 live births to 66 per 1,000
between 1972 and 1984. Yet the sex differentials in
infant and child mortality appear to be fairly
resilient to change (Das Gupta 1987), Similar find-
ings have been reported in a number of other vil-
lage-level studies from North India (e.g. Kynch
1994 cited in Jackson 1996).
What, if anything, can we conclude from the
Iranian scenario? While it would be reasonable to
interpret the observed sex bias in early age mortal-
ity as an outcome of the anti-female ideologies
expressed in health care practices, it is unlikely for
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the apparent convergence of male and female early
age mortality to be due to a modification of the dis-
criminatory norms and behaviour. In fact as the fol-
lowing section will show, over time gender divisions
and hierarchies have become even more accentu-
ated in the Rafsanjan district, and women have
become more of an economic liability' (Miller
1981). It may then very well be that discriminatory
ideologies and practices no longer translate into
mortality outcomes. The fact that gender bias may
no longer be reflected in mortality data also points
to other aspects of gender discrimination that are
not so easy to capture through quantitative indica-
tors of poverty It is to these issues that we now turn.
4 Why Vulnerability (Rather than
Poverty or Exclusion)?
Vulnerability, as the literature suggests, is not the
same as poverty Those who are vulnerable in any
society are exposed to particular risks, shocks and
stress, but they are not necessarily poor (Chambers
1989). Vulnerability is often contrasted with secu-
rity and linked with net assets - 'a wide range of
tangible and intangible stores of value or claims to
assistance which can be mobilised in a crisis' (Swift
1989: 11). The inclusion of intangible assets,
which should include kinship-based entitlements
or claims, goes a long way in making definitions of
vulnerability more sensitive to the particular cir-
cumstances that women find themselves in (even
though in Swift's own formulation there is no men-
tion of claims on other household members). As
Kabeer (1989) points out, these intrahousehold
kinship-based entitlements are particularly signifi-
cant for women's well-being and security in con-
texts where they are classified as dependent minors
within marriage. However, as we will see below,
even where marriage offers a considerable degree of
security and well-being, it does not seem to stop
women from striving to make their independent
entitlements - entitlements that are not mediated
through marriage, such as direct sale of labour
power or ownership of assets - more secure.
One of the recurring concerns that emerged in con-
versations with women from different social classes
in Rafsanjan was that of 'security' - the fear of 'being
abandoned' by their husbands, or of 'being left to
starve on the streets'. Curiously though, the
institution of marriage seemed to be quite stable:
there were only two cases of divorce (where men
had walked away from marriage) in the two villages.
In many ways the amelioration of poverty at the
household level has meant that men, who are the
ones who control the new sources of income, are in
a better position to meet their basic normative
obligations towards women (feeding the family),
and are thus less likely to 'walk off'. However,
despite the statistical insignificance of complete
male abdication of responsibility, and the predomi-
nance of cultural representations of marriage as a
'God-ordained and harmonious institution wherein
the husband is the breadwinner', women continue
to strategise for 'security' outside marriage. This
concern for security seems to reflect an acute aware-
ness of the bleak prospects that they face in case of
a breakdown in marriage given their deteriorating
and tenuous 'independent entitlements'. As we will
see below, the forces that have created opulence in
this region, have also served to make women more
dependent within marriage, and thus more vulnerable.
Women, like men, are also exposed to risks that are
generated from relying on the market, especially for
the sale of their labour power. However, the way in
which men and women experience these market-
generated risks are qualitatively different. As Kabeer
points out in the context of Bangladesh, even when
women have such independent entitlements 'they
may prefer to exercise them in ways that do not dis-
rupt kinship-based entitlements, their primary
source of survival and security' (1989: 9). As we
will see below, both women's entry into the wage
labour market and their access to land in Rafsanjan
are very much shaped by their willingness to pre-
serve these kinship-based entitlements. Moreover,
even within the market the issue of gender discrim-
ination is not confined to the quantitative differen-
tial between male and female wages (even when
'pure' wage discrimination exists and is captured).
The different 'exchange rates' that male and female
labour obtain on the market constitute an impor-
tant component of gender differentials in poverty, as
well as being an excellent indicator of the social
embeddedness of markets (markets as 'bearers of
gender'). But equally important are the qualitative
terms on which female and male labour get con-
tracted. These differences in labour relations
amount to different structures of vulnerability for
men and women within the labour market.
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Finally, since vulnerability points to specific areas of
risk it does not preclude the possibility that those
who are threatened by certain conditions may also
be able to count upon strengths and advantages in
other areas in order to avoid harm. It thus leads to
less fatalistic analysis than reliance upon concepts
like poverty and exclusion which are descriptions of
end states in which people have lost out (Hewitt de
Alcantara 1996). In Rafsanjan, for example, we find
that through a number of 'feminine' investment
strategies women seek to strengthen their indepen-
dent entitlements: holding on to their wages and
investing them in assets that are relatively resilient
to male predation - gold, for example, that can be
hidden away, and housing improvements which
men cannot appropriate for themselves. An under-
standing of vulnerability that draws attention to
instances of purposive action (or agency) is particu-
larly useful when we look at the situation of women
in the so-called 'patriarchal belt', given the over-
whelming tendency to see these women as helpless
and subordinated victims.
5 From Sharecroppers to Landed
Labourers
One of the most spectacular developments of the
past two decades in the Rafsanjan basin has been
the gradual erosion of large-scale landlordism and
the emergence of a more mixed rural economy that
includes both extensive plantation-type operations
using wage labour as well as smaliholdings. The
change has been facilitated through both state pol-
icy (1962 Land Reform Programme 1979 'revolu-
tionary pumps') and local-level initiatives by the
landless sharecroppers - including encroachment
on common property lands. By the late 1980s when
the field research was carried out more than 70 per
cent of the households in the two villages owned
some land and irrigation water. As might be
expected, it is predominantly men who own these
titles. The bulk of the male household heads are in
fact landed wage labourers in a highly segmented
labour market where the attached labourers occupy
the apex, and the casual labourers the lower rungs.
Thus in most cases the livelihood strategies of
Rafsanjani households include both own-account
farming of cash crops as well as sale of labour
power. Only a small minority of households can be
truly classified as 'middle peasants' who own rela-
tively sizeable pistachio plots and do not hire out
any labour (male or female).
It is widely recognised that the rural poor tend to
rely more heavily than the rich on common prop-
erty resources for meeting their basic needs. As
might be expected, the rummage for land and water
and the encroachment of private pistachio gardens
onto common property lands in Rafsanjan has had
some adverse implications in class terms - the
poorer households, for example, now have to rely
on the market for their fuel requirements and for
some important food items. While this may mean a
reduction in the amount of time women spend on
household reproduction (e.g. procuring firewood),
at the same time, it has undermined their indepen-
dent pastoral activities which relied heavily on the
village common lands for grazing. With their pas-
toral activities (processing a variety of dairy prod-
ucts) women provided an important component of
the household's diet; they were also able to sell, or
exchange, some of the products they processed on
the market. Today only a small minority of village
women engage in pastoral activities, and they tend
to come from the more affluent households which
have access to the capital needed for purchasing
animal feed and other inputs. Moreover, the fact
that animal feed now has to be purchased from
merchants, rather than procured (through grazing
or cutting of weeds), has led to greater male involve-
ment in what was a predominantly female sphere.
At the same time, the fact that pistachio monocul-
ture has replaced a more diverse agricultural econ-
omy which included both food and cash crops
(wheat, barley, cotton, pistachio), combined with
the rising levels of household income as a result of
changes in land ownership and in labour relations,
have served to narrow down women's labour par-
ticipation. Up until the early 1970s women, along
with men, participated in both grain harvests as
well as cotton and pistachio picking. Needless to
say women's in-kind wages for harvesting wheat
The disappearance of these cottage industries
throughout most of Iran has to be explained in terms of
the government's cheap import policies in the post-1960s
oil boom.
" In response to direct questions about how they assess
the changes in their working lives over time women
express satisfaction about not having to perform
fieldwork any more. This is not surprising. For a start,
women's responses have to be seen in their historical
context: the nature of the work they did was vety
arduous; moreover, it was performed within a social
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and barley were a fraction of men's, as were the
money wages that they received for pistachio pick-
ing. In the case of cotton, harvest workers were paid
on a piece-rate basis. With the cotton that women
procured during the harvest season they wove
coarse cotton fabrics that were used for both house-
hold consumption and sold, or exchanged, on the
market." As is argued below (Sectïon 6), the
changes in crop portfolio and the increasing levels
of household opulence have reduced women's par-
ticipation in field work and their opportunities for
earning an income.
More importantly, the gains from land ownership
have tended to be contradictory for women. The
income from pistachio is in most cases completely
controlled by men; most of the women interviewed
did not even know how much their husbands had
earned on the sale of pistachio in the previous year.
In many ways pistachio has the characteristics of
what Longhurst (1988) calls a 'wicked' crop: it is a
non-food crop; it takes several seasons to mature
and the revenues from it are lumpy (as opposed to
crops like tea), which make it easier for men to
monopolise. This does not necessarily mean that
some of the income does not 'trickle down' to
women through male-dominated decision-making
processes - in the form of more food, for example,
or increased leisure time. In fact with the extra
income most men are now able to meet their house-
holds' basic food requirements and women's
income-earning activities have become less essential
for household survival. However, the way in which
the gender relations have adjusted to these changes
in livelihood strategies has had some contradictory
implications for women. Most crucially, the
increased leisure time', has to be set against the loss
of economic independence and autonomy and the
sense of vulnerability that it has entailed - a trade-
off which women are only too aware of.'2
setting where as wives/daughters/sisters of sharecroppers
ïn a 'feudal' system they occupied very unfavourable
positions, being at the 'beck and call' of the landlord and
open to all sorts of abuse. However, in conversations
about other issues it becomes clear that women are very
concerned about the loss of economic independence. In
other words, it would be very easy on the basis of a quick
questionnaire for the observer to conclude that women
are satisfied with the changes in their economic status.
However, from comprehensive conversations and a more
contextual approach it becomes clear that women
assessments of the situation are more nuanced.
6 Women's Control of their Own
Labour Power: Translating Labour
into Wages
The rights that men and women have to their own
labour and to the labour of each other tend to be
unequal, especially where the norms of female pro-
priety are more strictly enforced. Poverty very often
undermines the norms of seclusion and wifely
dependence, which tend to constrain women's abil-
ity to dispose of their own labour power, while opu-
lence upholds them. This can be seen in both
historical and cross-class comparisons. Today work-
ing in the village orchards during the harvest season
is seen as a sign of destitution - only a small group
of older widows can afford to violate the norms of
propriety and seclusion set by the more affluent
classes. But many female respondents can recall
working in the grain-rich regions in the vicinity
during several harvest seasons (wheat, cotton, pis-
tachio) each year as recently as in the 1970s. This
redefinition of gendered space has meant that the
labour market has become even more segmented
than it was in the past, pushing the bulk of the
female work force into post-harvest processing,
which is carried out indoors and is confined to a
couple of months a year. Even in this case some of
the younger married women find that their access
to the labour market is blocked by their husbands
who claim that working in the processing centres
can have an adverse impact on the health of their
children (who are taken along with their mothers).
While most women express satisfaction about not
having to do arduous work 'under the sun', a num-
ber of women were clearly concerned about their
limited employment options. Some of the younger
unmarried women from the casual labouring
households defy the village norms on propriety -
which they say are set by the rich and do not apply
to them. They walk to the nearby villages to work
in the processing operations when the processing
work in their own village ends, despite the accusa-
tions of misconduct that it entails.
Within the labour market a number of factors -
social norms and structural vulnerabilities - con-
strain women's ability to translate their labour into
The proportion of female labour (to total labour) falls
from around 38 per cent to 25 per cent and finally 16 per
cent with increasing mechanisation.
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wages. For a start the repetitive tasks that are allo-
cated to women (like pistachio peeling and sorting)
are the ones that get substituted by machines. This
is already happening in the Rafsanjan basin, but so
far the labour displacing effect of post-harvest
mechanisation has been offset by the rise in pista-
chio production (due to expanding acreage under
cultivation).'3 Given the lack of alternative employ-
ment opportunities for women that are equally
remunerative and dignified, mechanisation has
grave implications for the bulk of the village women
who rely on post-harvest processing for an inde-
pendent source of income.'4
While it is difficult to talk about pure wage dis-
crimination in this context, given the highly seg-
mented nature of the labour market, some rough
estimates can be given by comparing wage rates for
male and female harvest workers (even though
there are not that many female harvest workers).
This gives an estimated 60 per cent wage differen
rial, which seems to have been fairly constant over
a number of years. Although employers tend to
explain the differential in wages in terms of men's
higher productivity, women workers dispute their
reasoning (after all, pistachio picking requires the
famous 'nimble fingers'). A more critical manifesta-
tion of discrimination though are the social norms
and power relations which serve to construct female
workers as different from (and inferior to) male
workers within the labour market. One of the most
serious disadvantages facing the female labourers is
the timing of payment and the way in which their
wage rates are settled. Employers do not very often
announce the wages they are offering in advance.
Moreover, most women are paid two to three
months after the processing operations have ended.
In contrast, the wages of male casual labourers are
settled before they commence work and payment is
prompt. The notion of women's wages as jahiz
money -. money used for making a trousseau - like
that of 'pin money' or 'money for lipstick' supports
the view that women's earnings from wage work are
minor and that they are neither essential to her sub-
sistence, nor to her family maintenance. It ensures
that women are constructed as less than full labourers.
Some forms of home-based work that are available to
women have very low financial returns (e.g. quilt
making); domestic work which entails loss of dignity and
autonomy, is one of the least desirable occupations in
these villages.
Indicative of women's vulnerability within the
labour market has been the way in which interna-
tional pressures have worked themselves out at the
local level. Over the past two years in response to
protectionist threats from importing countries on
grounds of health and hygiene, the Rafsanjan
Pistachio Producers Cooperative (a private' institu-
tion with strong government links, responsible for
the marketing of pistachio exports) has encouraged
employers to forbid their female wage labourers
from bringing their young children along to the
processing centres (on the grounds that young chil-
dren contaminate the pistachio). Ironically, there
seems to have been much less concern about the
health hazards of millions of tons of toxic pesticides
that are sprayed over the basin's orchards each year.
This seems to have induced a response in a number
of villages, where female workers have organised
'creche' facilities on the premises. While women's
response is indicative of their willingness to do
something about the discriminatory forces that are
working against them, it is difficult to be jubilant
about the situation. Indicative of women workers'
weak power base is the fact that neither the employ-
ers nor any of the relevant public authorities have
made any financial contributions to these sponta-
neous effórts (while lavish subsidies are available on
many other inputs/services).
A more forceful indication of women's agency can
be found when we look at women's labour obliga-
tions within marriage. The picture emerging from
smallholder agriculture is in many ways typical of
'male farming': men own most of the land, they
make all the production decisions, they purchase
the inputs, make the marketing decisions and con-
trol the revenues. But it is not uncommon to find
wives - especially in the more affluent households
where women do not work in the wage labour mar-
ket - demanding a wage for processing their hus-
bands' harvest, and fairly customary for husbands
to acquiesce to this demand (where they don't, the
wife very often secretly takes her share from his pis-
tachio harvest). Women's demand for a wage effec-
tively undermines the notion that a wife's labour
obligations within marriage is part of her wifely
duties.
In some situations a system of reward in kind for a
wife's labour already exists and is extended to
include a new crop (e.g. Guyer 1980), In Rafsanjan,
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however, such a system does not appear to have
existed - neither in practice nor as a cultural para-
digm. Although there may have been some prece-
dence for this claim in the Islamic notion that a wife
can demand a 'wage' from her husband in return for
breastfeeding, it is nevertheless critical to ask why
women in this particular region are claiming a wage
for their family labour obligations (since it is not a
widespread practice throughout Iran) and why they
are doing so now. It seems to us that women's
demand for a wage is in response to their restricted
access to an independent source of income (for rea-
sons noted above) in an increasingly monetised set-
ting, and to their inability to tap into their
husbands' cash earnings. In other words, it is in
response to the pressures generated through the
changing socio-economic context and the changing
conjugal rights and obligations that women are
invoking this new claim, thereby forcing a re-nego-
tiation of the conjugal contract.
7 Translating Wages into Assets
While it is not the intention of this section to
directly assess whether or not women's wage
employment is having an impact on power relations
within the household, issues of power are neverthe-
less implicit when we look at ways in which women
try to retain control over their wages and translate
them into assets that provide a degree of security
and well-being. To add some clarity to the discus-
sion it would be useful to say a few words about the
scope and the context of women's employment.
First, leaving aside for the moment the familial ide-
ologies and social processes that intervene to differ-
entiate men's and women's wages, any empowering
affect that women's wages may have is likely to be
reduced where that employment is seasonal (rather
than constant throughout the year). This is likely to
be the case partly because it does not provide an
adequate 'fall back' position for women, and also
because in monetary terms it makes a smaller con-
tribution to household survival than would full-
time work (perceived contributions), thereby
weakening their claims on household resources and
reducing the threat of its withdrawal. In addition,
the forms of social solidarity that may emerge from
working in a collective enterprise are likely to be
more tenuous when the work is carried out on a
seasonal or ad hoc basis than when it is full-time.
The fact that women workers in these villages have
not so far responded to the unfair manner in which
their wage rates are settled, for example, may have
to be explained in these terms.
The second point worth noting is the fact that
women's processing work is carried out outside the
household premises and under social relationships
that are not familial; this should make it easier for
women to control the proceeds. In Rafsanjan
women deal directly with their employers (or
bailiffs and managers representing the employer)
and without the mediation of their husbands!
fathers. This arrangement is quite different from the
situation of home-based carpet weavers of central
Iran described by Afshar (1985), where village
women supply practically all the labour input while
their husbands make the critical production and
marketing decisions and control the proceeds from
the sale of carpets.°
The seasonal nature of women's work and the fact
that their wages are obtained in bulk, tends to have
a number of other implications as well. Even
though in some households, usually the poorer
casual labouring households, women spent a por-
tion of their wage on food requirements, this was
not a prevalent pattern. The general trend seems to
be for men to allocate a portion of their wage to
housekeeping (given its regular nature), while
women earmark their wages for bulkier, non-food
items. These include articles for the house (doors,
glass for windows, bricks and tiles, roof repair);
gold; consumer durables for their daughters'
trousseau; and smaller non-food items like clothes
and household durables. Under pressure from their
husbands and fathers, women also reluctantly con-
tribute to agricultural investments - purchase of
land and water.
A number of factors - divisibility, ease of sale or
mortgage, and maintaining value in bad times -
have been identified as characteristics of tangible
assets that appear important to vulnerable house-
holds (Chambers 1989). Women's investment
strategies in Rafsanjan reveal a couple of additional
characteristics that tangible assets need to have: the
ease with which they can be concealed or hidden
away ('hidden assets'), and the indivisibility of their
' In many ways (gender division of labour, marriage similar to Rafsanjan - both fall within the central Iranian
patterns) the region where Afshar did her research was plateau.
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benefits (communal consumption); the two charac-
teristics seem to be mutually exclusive. Gold and
jewelery are the perfect female assets since in addi-
tion to the factors highlighted by Chambers
(above), they are also easy to conceal. Women's
investments in housing seem to conform to the sec-
ond characteristic noted above: although they can-
not be concealed (as in the case of gold), the
benefits flowing from improved housing have to be
used communally - they cannot be diverted away
for individual use.
Very often when a young couple move into their
new 'home' the building is still incomplete, and a
significant proportion of the wife's wages tend to be
spent on the needed repairs and constructions.
While women's preferences for investing their
wages in their homes may be interpreted as yet
another manifestation of their attachment to the
collective or family aspects of consumption, in this
case their motives seem to be more complex. In
most households, the house and the land on which
it is built constitute the wife's mehr - the contractual
wealth that will have to be transferred to her upon
divorce. Although in practice these contractual
obligations are very rarely upheld, women were
aware of their legal rights and explained their hous-
ing investments in these terms. More important
though, unlike assets such as agricultural land, the
benefits from housing cannot be alienated by the
more powerful members of the household for their
own personal use. The land that women inherit
from their fathers, for example, tends to be man-
aged by their husbands, along with any other land
that he owns; and he controls the proceeds in much
the same way that he controls the income from his
own land. It is not therefore surprising that married
women refrain from investing their wages in
land/water (they nevertheless pressurise their hus-
bands to specify a share of his land for them in a
will, given the uncertainties that surround the
enforcement of legal prescriptions). The only
women who worked and saved in order to buy a
plot of land and a share of water were some of the
village widows. Married women's preferences for
investing their savings in the home can be better
understood if they are seen in the context of these
gender-based constraints.
Somewhat similar motivations underpin women's
preferences for investing their wages in the
trousseau. For a start it has to be noted that unlike
the Hindu dowry which is a flow of gifts from the
bride's family to the groom's, the Iranian jahiz
belongs to the bride (and her household). In fact, it
is very often the only share a daughter has from her
parents' wealth (Afshar 1985). And yet at the same
time, the transition from a semi-subsistence to a
cash economy combined with the increasing opu-
lence of the village elite is increasing the financial
burden of the trousseau, which now includes a vari-
ety of bulky consumer durables like television sets
and refrigerators. Women from the less affluent
households are thus under increasing pressure to
ensure a minimum respectability for themselves
and their daughters by procuring a 'descent'
trousseau - a burden to which men refuse to
contribute.
It is quite common to find men complaining about
their wife's reluctance to contribute to their agricul-
tural investments, while they 'waste' large sums of
money on the trousseau. This does not, however,
mean that women exercise complete control over
their wages. In nearly all casual labouring house-
holds when land and water was being purchased,
women's wages constituted a significant proportion
of the funds with which their fathers and husbands
purchased land (and thereby became landed for the
first time, or increased their holdings). In this case
though, women relinquish their wages under pres-
sure - both subtle and direct - from their husbands.
The following two illustrations are taken from two
case studies where there had been open conflicts
between husband and wife on this issue.
Mehdi is a casual labourer in his early 30s. In 1987
he purchased loo ghassab of land with his savings
from his wages, his wife's wages from pistachio pro-
cessing and the sale of her gold ring and bracelets
(which she had purchased with her wages prior to
her marriage). Roughly one-third of the money was
hers. As she explained:
I told him 'since I am also paying for the land,
then at least register some of it in my name'
he said we don't have any joda-savayi (Fati)
The expression joda-savayi translated literally
means 'separate-otherness'. To be individuated,
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autonomous, and covetous of one's own sphere is a
culturally negative concept. Here Mehdi was imply-
ing that they constitute a single unit, thereby disap-
proving of her selfish demand.
Asghar, another casual labourer and his wife,
Maryam, both in their early 30s, purchased their
first plot of land (50 ghassab) in 1985. In this case
Maryam provided half the funds by selling her gold
(which she had purchased in previous years), while
Asghar paid for the rest with his savings from wage
labouring. Maryam, however, insisted that 25 ghas-
sah of the land should be registered in her name
and he agreed. As she put it:
I told him that I would sell my gold only if what
I paid for was made in my own name because
what if he leaves me and enjoys the land with
another woman? (Maryam)
While the consumerism and class differentiation
which are the direct outcomes of Rafsanj an's growth
trajectory seem to underpin the inflation of the
trousseau, it is a mistake to see the conflict between
husband and wife over the trousseau as a conflict
between 'essential' and 'non-essential' categories of
expenditure (as the village men seem to do). After
all, the expenses for wedding festivities to which
men contribute substantial sums of money are even
more superfluous (and even more so is their expen-
diture on narcotics - opium). More importantly,
women's preferences for investing in the house and
in household durables has to be seen in the context
of male control over productive assets like land and
dairy animals. In a neighbouring region (Bardsir)
where the rural economy has remained semi-sub-
sistence and where women continue to play a dom-
inant role in the pastoral economy, not only does
the trousseau include dairy animals (rather than
bulky consumer durables), but women are also
active pastoral entrepreneurs in their own right,
reinvesting their savings from the sale of milk and
wool in dairy animals (Razavi 1992).
8 Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this
account. First, while female disadvantage in early
age mortality is indicative of discriminatory forces
operating against female infants and children, the
convergence of male and female life chances does
not necessarily mean that those discriminatory
norms and behaviour have been modified. The dis-
appearance of excess female mortality may just be
an outcome of the mortality decline itself. In the
case study reviewed in this paper we have found
that the overall improvements in infant and child
survival, due in large part to public sector invest-
ments in sanitation and health care, have also led to
the disappearance of excess female mortality (but it
is important to emphasise that this is not an
inevitable or irreversible outcome). Ironically, the
disappearance of excess female mortality has hap-
pened at the same time that gender hierarchies have
become more accentuated and women have
become more of an economic 'liability' in this
region. It thus seems to us that well-being indica-
tors, such as mortality, may be too blunt; they can-
not capture some of the qualitative changes in
gender relations that have left women 'worse off'.
These qualitative issues were discussed under the
rubric of vulnerability - the bundles of risk stem-
ming from the deterioration in women's indepen-
dent entitlements and from the changes in conjugal
relations, which are hemming women in and mak-
ing them more dependent on male incomes. On the
one hand, the rising levels of household income
appear to have strengthened the norms of propriety
which tend to constrain women's ability to dispose
of their own labour power. This can be seen in the
withdrawal of female labour from farm work and its
limitation to operations that are spatially (indoor
and village-based) and temporally (seasonal) con-
fined. On the other hand, the weakening of
women's own-account economic activities and the
rising levels of cash income that are directed into
men's hands have made women more dependent on
male incomes. It was nevertheless argued that even
where marriage offers some degree of security and
well-being to women - because men control the
main sources of income and are able to meet their
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basic normative obligations towards women - it
does not seem to stop women from striving to make
their independent entitlements more secure.
Women's strategies include: engaging in wage
labour (albeit within a segmented labour market)
and retaining control over their earnings; demand-
ing a wage for their family labour obligations;
demanding a share of the family legacy; and con-
verting their wages into assets that are less
vulnerable to male predation.
In making sense of these qualitative changes we
found the notion of 'vulnerability' to be quite useful
because it highlighted issues of risk and security
which seem to be central to the narrative. At the
same time it also drew attention to women's strate-
gies for avoiding harm - issues of agency The lat-
ter are sometimes absent from analyses that rely
upon concepts like poverty and exclusion which are
descriptions of end states in which people have lost
out.
Finally, as far as policy is concerned, increasing lev-
els of household opulence seem to have had con-
tradictory implications for women in this particular
region - improving their survival chances, reducing
their work burden, but also making them more
dependent on male incomes and thus more inse-
cure within marriage. The obvious lesson seems to
be that the amelioration of poverty at the household
level does not necessarily leave the female members
'better off'. As was noted at the beginning of this
paper, the specific ways in which macro-policies
affect women depend on a variety of mediating fac-
tors, amongst them the growth trajectory, the vari-
ous institutions that mediate the benefits of growth
and the pre-existing gender relations. If poverty
reduction is to be combined with gender equity,
then alternative ways will have to be found -
through changes in some or all of these institutions
- in making 'development' truly gender-equitable.
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